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Abstract This article draws comparisons between the Three Mile Island accident 
in 1979 and the far more severe accident at Fukushima. It cites lessons that were 
learned from Three Mile Island and suggests how they improved the performance 
of the nuclear power industry in the United States. The article also draws other, 
perhaps less apparent, lessons from the history of nuclear power.
Keywords Three Mile Island · Nuclear industry · Radiation hazards · Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission
The accidents that occurred at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Unit 2 plant in 
Pennsylvania in March 1979 and the Fukushima Daiichi plants in Japan in March 
2011 are generally and correctly regarded as two of the three most serious in the 
history of commercial nuclear power (Chernobyl, of course, is the third). For that 
reason, both accidents need to be carefully studied and appropriate lessons need 
to be learned. Although TMI and Fukushima differed in causes and consequences, 
they provide powerful incentives to investigate what happened and to draw conclu-
sions that, if properly applied, can help to prevent, or at least mitigate the effects 
of, nuclear power accidents in the future.
Any account of TMI and Fukushima must recognize their important dissimilarities. 
TMI is usually and erroneously described as a disaster. Although it was a gut-wrench-
ing crisis and although a significant portion of the core melted, it did not result in large 
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releases of dangerous forms of radiation. The plant emitted several million curies of 
noble gases after the accident, but they present slight hazards to human health. Only 
small amounts of volatile radioactive isotopes that pose the greatest risks escaped 
into the environment. The accident released less than 20 curies of iodine-131 and no 
strontium-90, cesium-137, or plutonium. Careful epidemiological studies of a cohort 
of about 32,000 people who lived within a 5 mile radius of the plant have shown no 
increase in the incidence of cancer or other diseases that could be attributed to the acci-
dent. Most of the approximately 144,000 people who voluntarily evacuated returned 
to their homes within a few days and schools re-opened two weeks after the accident.
By contrast, Fukushima released radioactive iodine, strontium, cesium, and plu-
tonium to the environment. The off-site quantities were larger, more widespread, 
and more worrisome than the amounts that escaped from TMI. The Washington 
Post reported in April 2011, that “experts predict no long-term health consequences 
on residents in the region,” and that assessment has continued to hold. Nevertheless, 
the local population has suffered from the stress and trauma of a mandatory evacu-
ation and all the trials of dislocation, uncertainty, and anxiety. For those reasons, 
Fukushima qualifies as a disaster, though far short of the magnitude of Chernobyl.
Despite those differences, there are critical lessons to be learned from what 
occurred at TMI that apply to Fukushima and to nuclear power in general.
1. Accidents can and probably will occur in unexpected ways. The TMI-2 acci-
dent was largely a result of mistakes on the part of the operators in the con-
trol room. Their training did not prepare them for the loss-of-coolant accident 
that began when the pressure-operated relief valve (PORV) stuck open and 
allowed the escape of coolant from the core. The instrument panel in the con-
trol room provided little useful information on what was happening in the core. 
The operators feared that the pressurizer was in danger of “going solid” from 
an excess of water, and therefore, they cut the flow of water to the core from 
the emergency core cooling systems to a trickle. In that way, they unwittingly 
transformed what should have been a minor incident into a massive meltdown. 
At Fukushima, of course, the original causes of the accident were the earth-
quake and tsunami, which were of perhaps unprecedented and certainly unan-
ticipated magnitude. The worst effects occurred because the diesel generators 
that were designed to provide back-up power to the plant were submerged by 
the tsunami. Plant designers and engineers take elaborate precautions to guard 
against accidents as severe as TMI and Fukushima, but in those cases, their 
efforts were not enough. It seems axiomatic that other accidents are likely to 
happen in unexpected ways, and designers, engineers, and builders must do 
their utmost to ensure that plants can withstand such occurrences or at least 
minimize the consequences. Extending the margin of safety as much as possi-
ble is advisable, perhaps essential. At TMI, the overdesign of the pressure ves-
sel almost certainly kept it from failing after the core meltdown and might well 
have prevented a more serious accident.
2. When accidents occur, they have to be thoroughly investigated and frankly 
evaluated. After TMI, extensive and hard-hitting investigations were conducted 
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by the President’s Commission on the Accident at TMI (usually referred to as 
the Kemeny Commission after its chairman, John G. Kemeny), Congress, the 
state of Pennsylvania, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The 
reports of those investigations, including the one sponsored by the NRC, made 
no effort to spare the feelings or the sensitivities of the NRC or the nuclear 
industry. They came down hard on the NRC for failing to do a better job of reg-
ulating and the industry for failing to do more to ensure the safety of the plants 
it built and operated. There was no doubt in anyone’s mind at the NRC or in the 
field of nuclear power that broad reforms were needed if the industry was to 
survive. However painful it was to be targets of unvarnished criticism, the NRC 
and the industry took it well and moved on to make impressive progress in both 
safety and performance.
3. A closely related lesson is that lessons need to be learned, remembered, and 
heeded. Before TMI, the NRC and the nuclear industry believed that they had 
resolved questions regarding reactor safety and that nuclear plants were well-
protected against a severe accident. TMI was a shocking and humbling experi-
ence, and both the NRC and the industry took the lessons of the experience to 
heart. It was clear from the sequence of events during the accident that although 
the safety equipment in the plant performed according to design, there were glar-
ing flaws in what were known as “human factors.” The NRC made important 
changes in its regulations to address, among other things, significant shortcom-
ings in operator training, control room design, instrumentation, and communi-
cations. Likewise, the industry took a series of steps to fix the weaknesses the 
accident revealed, including programs to make operator training more rigorous. 
The action with perhaps the greatest impact was the creation of an industry-
funded organization, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), which 
came to serve as the conscience of the industry and to exert effective peer pres-
sure to bring about necessary changes. The result was that industry performance 
in the areas of both safety and reliability was vastly improved. For example, the 
capacity factor across the industry increased from less than 60 % in the 1970s 
to more than 90 % in the early 2000s. This is not to say that all problems in the 
nuclear industry were solved. There were still serious lapses—two prominent 
examples were the embarrassment of sleeping control room operators at the 
Peach Bottom plant in Pennsylvania in 1987 and the discovery of a football-
sized cavity in the head of the pressure vessel at Davis-Besse in Ohio in 2002. 
Nevertheless, the application of key lessons learned from TMI was a major factor 
in improving nuclear power safety in the United States.
These lessons of TMI, at least in retrospect, are fairly obvious. But there are also 
other lessons from the history of nuclear power that are perhaps less apparent and 
that have important implications for the future of nuclear power in the United 
States and abroad.
1. Nuclear power will always be judged by standards that are different and more 
demanding than those applied to other sources of energy or societal risk. This 
is in part an appropriate response to the possibility of a catastrophic accident 
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at a nuclear plant. But it is also a function of unique fears of nuclear power. 
The news media and the public seem far more uncomfortable with the small 
(though real) likelihood of a disastrous nuclear meltdown than with the well-
documented costs in human health and lives of other forms of energy. This 
pattern also applies to elements of societal risk in general. In 1978, a public 
opinion sampling of college students and members of the League of Women 
Voters in Oregon asked them to rank thirty sources of risk “according to the 
present risk of death from each.” Both groups rated nuclear power as number 
one, ahead of smoking, motor vehicles, motorcycles, handguns, and alcoholic 
beverages. There is every reason to believe that the same poll would produce 
similar results in 2011. One indication is that media coverage in the United 
States of the effects of the Fukushima earthquake and tsunami tended to devote 
far more attention to the meltdowns at the nuclear plant than to the tragedy 
that took place throughout the region. Despite the severity of the damage to 
the plants, at least they remained standing and the amounts of radiation they 
released, while disturbing, were not catastrophic. This was not the case for the 
homes, schools, hospitals, factories, and other structures that were flattened by 
the earthquake and tsunami and in which thousands of people perished.
2. An important reason for the fear of nuclear power is exaggerated public anxi-
ety about radiation. This was made vividly clear after Fukushima when citizens 
bought out supplies of potassium iodide and Geiger counters from stores—in 
California! This might have been a reasonable action for residents of Japan, 
given the uncertainties about the condition of the plants, but it hardly seemed 
necessary for those who lived on the other side of the Pacific Ocean. The rea-
sons for acute public fear of even low-level radiation are rooted deep in history 
and have a great deal to do with media coverage. For a period of more than 
65 years after Hiroshima, radiation hazards were a source of an abundance of 
sustained publicity, and, as a result, of uniquely intense public fears. In many 
cases, the news stories were ill-informed and distorted. Even when media 
reports on radiation were balanced and accurate, the information they con-
veyed was frequently unsettling. The distinction between accounts of radiation 
effects and those of other technological hazards with some similar characteris-
tics, such as dangerous chemicals, electrical shocks, fossil fuels, dam failures, 
food additives, and genetic engineering, was more quantitative than qualitative. 
Radiation was different in remaining a regular source of headlines for decades. 
After Hiroshima, the many ramifications of nuclear energy were big news, and 
the effects of radiation were a major part of the story. The nature of radiation 
risks generated public apprehension, but the prevalent anxieties were greatly 
enhanced by the visibility that radiation issues commanded. Although most 
experts agreed that public fears of low-level radiation far exceeded the risks 
of exposure, those fears were hardly unreasonable based on the information or 
impressions that the public gleaned from the popular media.
3. A final lesson from the history of nuclear power is the importance of knowing 
something about the history of nuclear power. For example, practically every 
news story that refers to the early history of the industry quotes a statement 
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made in 1954 by the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis 
Strauss, that nuclear power would be “too cheap to meter.” This is cited as evi-
dence of how optimistic or how foolish nuclear advocates were as the nuclear 
power industry got under way. The problem is that nobody, not even Lewis 
Strauss, believed that nuclear power would be so cheap. Strauss was engaging 
in a flight of fancy that was not consistent with the views of nuclear experts or 
the electric power industry then or later. Yet this statement has become part of a 
misleading mythology about the early history of the technology. Another more 
recent example is the continuing belief or assumption that TMI was a disaster, 
or worse, that radiation releases were far greater and the health effects far more 
extensive than the federal government, the state government, or the nuclear 
power industry has ever admitted. This charge has no basis in evidence, but it 
remains an article of faith among some people and makes at least occasional 
appearances in media reports.
It is essential to get the history of the nuclear power industry and of radiation pro-
tection right if we are to deal intelligently and effectively with the serious chal-
lenges presented by the Fukushima accident. It is also essential if we are to make 
informed choices about the options available to us, including a full accounting of 
the risks and benefits of all energy sources, to meet the growing demands for elec-
trical power in the future.
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction 
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
